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performance and profitability showed significant relationship at 5% and 95% confidence 
interval towards the performance of those companies except for liquidity and solvency. At 
the end of this study, it is recommended that other variable and factor should be used for 
future research namely the turn over asset as dependant variable and political issue as factor 
since it may have impact on acquiring company. Additionally, it is also recommended for 
future research to include companies that involved in series of M&A in multiple years 
especially during the financial global crisis. 
Keywords: Liquidity; Solvency; Profitability; Operating performance; Mergers and 
Acquisitions; Malaysia 
5. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISM AND FRAUD IN ACCOUNTING INFORMATION 
(F80) 
Satria Yudhia Wijaya, Danang Mintoyuwono (UPN “Veteran” Jakarta) 
Email: satria.wijaya@gmail.com 
This research aims to see whether the company that has a corporate governance mechanism 
will reduce the likelihood of restatement. The existence of restatement would be considered 
a material misstatement by the investor. Corporate governance mechanisms are expected to 
be able to reduce the likelihood of restatement, which include: the existence of the board of 
directors who come from non-management (outside director) and the existence of the audit 
committee. The results support H1 that the company has a composition of non-management 
directors who do the restatement is lower than companies that do not do the restatement. 
However, research results do not support H2 that the existence of an audit committee 
would reduce the occurrence of restatement. 
Keywords: Restatement; Corporate governance; Accounting information 
6. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AGENCY PROBLEMS AND FIRM PERFORMANCE ON 
FAMILY FIRMS IN INDONESIA (F34) 
D. Agus Harjito (Universitas Islam Indonesia) 
Email: agus_h@uii.ac.id / harjitok@yahoo.com 
The objective of this study is to investigate the relationship between the agency problem 
mechanisms with firm performance on family firms in Indonesia. If there is a negative 
relationship between the mechanisms of reducing agency problems means there is a 
substitution relationship between the mechanisms of reducing the agency problems that 
agency costs can be reduced. However, if there is a positive relationship means that the 
increasing use of one of the mechanisms reducing agency problems will increase the use of 
other mechanism reducing agency problems. The sample of this study are 46 companies that 
obtained by the method of purposive sampling. To analyze the relationship between 
variables simultaneously, this study uses two-stage least squares (2SLS) method. The result 
shows that there is significant relationship exists between debt policy and dividend policy. 
But, there is no significant relationship between insider ownership and debt policy, and 
between insider ownership and dividend policy in reducing agency problems in the family 
firms in Indonesia although the firm performances proxied by Tobin’s Q are increase.  
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Abstract 
 
This research aims to see whether the company that has a corporate governance 
mechanism will reduce the likelihood of restatement. The existence of restatement 
would be considered a material misstatement by the investor. Corporate governance 
mechanisms are expected to be able to reduce the likelihood of restatement, which 
include: the existence of the board of directors who come from non-management 
(outside director) and the existence of the audit committee. The results support H1 that 
the company has a composition of non-management directors who do the restatement is 
lower than companies that do not do the restatement. However, research results do not 
support H2 that the existence of an audit committee would reduce the occurrence of 
restatement. 
Keywords : Restatement,  Corporate Governance, Accounting Information 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Financial statements is one of the tools for management to take some accountability for 
the management of the business and an indicator in considering decision-making by 
stakeholders, so it must be free of any material misstatement. The accounting fraud had 
taken place in various countries, including Indonesia. In the USA the accounting fraud 
had grown extensively, Spathis et al. (2002) explains that in the USA the accounting 
fraud led to huge losses in almost all industries. Accounting fraud and losses in the stock 
market was declining accountability management so as to make the shareholders increase 
the cost of monitoring of management. Generally, the accounting fraud related to 
corruption. In corruption, common actions that do include the manipulation of the 
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recording, the disappearance of documents, and mark-up the financial harm the country 
or economy of the country. 
Indonesia including State corruption ranked highest in the world. In Indonesia, the 
accounting fraud proved the existence of the liquidation of some banks, state owned 
enterprises and management filed a private criminal cases to court, banking, tax 
manipulation, and other cases. Despite the alleged accounting fraud is already 
chronically, but there is nothing a theoretical and empirical study in a comprehensive 
manner. The existence of these phenomena need to be a theoretical studies by the science 
of accountancy. 
Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling,1976) is often used to describe the accounting 
fraud. Agency theory intended to solve two problems going on in the agency relationship. 
One of them is a problem that arises when a) desire or goal of principals and agents 
against, and b) when the principal found it difficult to trace what was done by the agent. 
When the agent and the principal tried to maximize their utility, as well as have the desire 
and the motivation is different, then the agent (management) do not always act according 
to the wishes the principal (shareholders) will act as well as detrimental to shareholders, 
among other unethical behaviour and tend to do the accounting fraud. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976 ) explains that the principal can solve this problem by giving 
appropriate compensation to the agent, as well as the cost of monitoring. To get a good 
monitoring results , the company needed an effective internal control. To resolve the 
problem of agency management company should implement accounting rules correctly. 
Credibility of the information society requires ( Indonesian Institute of Accountants, 
2009). Agency problem also occurs , if principals find it difficult to discover what is 
actually done by the agent. This situation is referred to as information asymmetry. 
Actions taken by management is influenced by the situation of information asymmetry. 
Unethical behavior and tendencies accounting fraud also caused by a substantial case that 
attitudes and moral responsibility of the company. The company has a moral and social 
responsibility that at the operational level of moral responsibility in representing 
management. 
Several studies have shown that managers tend to perform earnings management with a 
variety of patterns ( sugiri, 1998; Healy, 1985; Cahan, 1992 ; Beattie, 1994). This fact is 
supported by several studies which concluded that this practice is a common practice. 
Levitt ( 1998 ) worried about this situation because earnings management practices can 
reduce the credibility of financial statements that are likely to harm the profession and 
that is going to harm people, especially investors in general. Impact globally if managers 
tend to ignore the interests of investors, it would cause the collapse of investors' 
expectations of return on investment that will lead to capital inflows to a State has 
decreased while capital outflows increased. The next result stock prices in the country 
will decline so it does not develop its capital markets and possible loss of value of 
currency exchange of the country. To avoid the bad consequences that result from 
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behavioral manipulation by managers who caused because of a conflict of interest 
between the owner and management, we need a mechanism that can align the various 
interests. According to the agency theory to address the lack of harmony of interest one 
of which is through the administration of a good corporate governance ( Shleifer and 
Vishny , 1997). 
Good corporate governance is concerned with how the investors believe that management 
will benefit them, sure they are not going to invest in projects that are not profitable, but 
it is also related to how investors control managers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Good corporate governance as a concept has no single definition, refers to the definition 
of corporate governance is a pattern of relationships, systems and processes used by the 
company to deliver value to shareholders on an ongoing basis in the long term, by taking 
into account the interests of other stakeholders, based on the laws and norms. From the 
above definition contained meaning that good corporate governance focus is providing 
guarantee / protection on the investment of shareholders investment in the company. 
Good corporate governance is concerned with how the investors believe that management 
will benefit them , sure they are not going to invest in projects that are not profitable , but 
it guarantees the rights of the investor can be achieved if the principles of good corporate 
governance is implemented in the activity company. The principle are [ 1 ] transparency 
in the decision making process and transparency in disclosing material information about 
the company and revelan , [ 2 ] independency state where the company is managed in a 
professional manner without any conflict of interest and influence / pressure from any 
party not in accordance with the laws and principles of a healthy organization, [ 3 ] 
accountability functions , implementation and accountability of the organization so that 
the management company to run effectively, [ 4 ] responsibility in the administration of 
the company that is spesific to the laws and principles healthy organization, and [ 5 ] the 
fairness, equitable treatment and equal rights in the meet stakeholder arising under 
treaties and regulations also related to how investors control managers (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997).  
In order to achieve the purpose of good corporate governance, we need a mechanism that 
is used to ensure that the activities of a company in a healthy walk in the direction that 
the set ( Syakhroza, 2005). Some good corporate governance mechanisms have been 
identified in previous empirical research, these mechanisms include internal mechanisms 
such as the board, audit committee, managerial ownership, executive compensation, and 
external mechanisms such as institutional ownership, and financing with debt ( Bernhart 
and Rosenstein, 1998). 
This study will examine the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms, in 
case the composition of the Board of Directors along with tenur and Accounting 
Information Fraud , as measured by the disclosure of information as set out in the capital 
market law ( Law No. 8/1995 concerning Capital Market, Law  No. 45/1995 concerning 
the Capital Market , and the Law no. 46/1995 on Audit Procedures in capital markets) . 
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The research will take samples of the observation period 1999-2010, in which the 
violations carried out by a public company listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange . 
 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Accounting fraud. Indonesian Institute of Accountants (2009 ) describes the accounting 
fraud as : ( 1 ) misstatements arising from fraudulent financial reporting misstatement or 
omission is intentional or the number of disclosures in the financial statements to deceive 
financial statement users, ( 2 ) misstatement arising from improper treatment of the asset ( 
often referred to as misuse or embezzlement ) relating to the theft of assets resulting 
entity financial statements are not presented in accordance with accounting principles 
generally accepted in Indonesia . Improper treatment of the entity's activities can be done 
in various ways, including embezzlement of receipt of goods / money , theft of assets , or 
actions which cause the entity pay for goods or services which are not received by the 
entity . This action can be accompanied by a note or a false or misleading document and 
may involve one or more individuals among management , employees , or third parties . 
From the perspective of criminal, fraudulent accounting categorized as white-collar 
crime. Geis and Meier ( 1997:40 ) cites Sutherland (1940 ) explains that the white-collar 
crime in the business world is a misstatement of financial statements , manipulation in the 
stock market, commercial bribery, bribery and acceptance of a bribe by a public official 
(directly or indirectly), cheating on taxes, and bankruptcy. In capital market activities, the 
accounting fraud will affect investors' reaction to the company's stock ( Feroz et al , 1991; 
Palmrose et al , 2004). Companies that get SEC reprimands decreased 13 % return for the 
period of 2 days of observations about the disclosure of accounting fraud ( Feroz et al, 
1991). While Palmrose et al ( 2004 ) using  restatement announcements as a proxy for the 
likelihood of accounting fraud . Research results found evidence that there is a negative 
return when the restatement firms  
Results of other studies about accounting fraud, accounting fraud shows that are 
influenced by the level of corruption in a country (Sheifer and Vishny (1993), Gaviria 
(2001)). There is empirical evidence of accounting fraud, both from abroad, as well as in 
Indonesia (Dechow et al., 1995; Wilopo, 2006) 
 
Corporate Governance . One role of the board of directors of the company is to minimize 
the cost of supervision due to the separation between the owner and the controlling 
decision in the modern enterprise. The Board of Directors will receive the delegation of 
authority to carry out internal control and control of the decision of the shareholders of 
the company. Delegation of authority is because the shareholders that it faces due to 
transfer risk from investors who hold shares for several companies at once, while the 
other side wants shareholders that management acts in accordance with the interests of 
the owners. The composition of the board of directors is one of the important factors that 
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will streamline the monitoring of the management policy. This interest will be effective if 
the composition of the board of directors is derived from the (management) and also from 
outside (non- management). This composition is expected to add value to the company. 
The existence of the board of directors from outside the company to be able to add to the 
reputation of the company, where outsiders would certainly staked name management 
and best performance. In addition to the experience of non- management board that will 
help build the company and is not directly oversee the operations of the company. The 
reason to use the board of directors from among the other non- management ( Beasley, 
1996 ) : ( 1 ) they are more experienced, ( 2 ) they understand the importance of control 
of the decision, and ( 3 ) they work in a controlled system. 
Theory proposed Fama ( 1980 ) and Fama & Jensen ( 1983 ) deals with the composition 
of the board of directors is the higher composition of the board of directors who come 
from non-management to improve the effectiveness of the board in conducting 
operational control management. The more effective control of the company is expected 
to reduce the possibility of fraud in accounting disclosure. Some previous research 
(Shivdasani, 1993 ) has classified board of directors who come from non- management as 
" independent directors " and " gray directors ". Independent directors is from outside the 
company and has no affiliation / relationship with the company and with the other board. 
While the director is gray directors from outside the company and the possibility of 
having affiliations with other directors in the company. The directors category is likely 
due to the problems raised by the affiliate relationship management. Fama (1980 ) and 
Fama & Jensen (1983 ) predicts that the high composition of independent directors will 
increase the effectiveness of the board of directors in monitoring management. The 
hypothesis in this study :  
H1 : The proportion of independent directors to the board of the company to 
commit fraud accounting information tends to be lower than companies that 
do not commit fraud accounting information . 
The existence of the board of directors of the company to monitor the operational 
management can not be separated from the formation of the audit committee. The board 
of directors will delegate authority over the control of the company to the audit 
committee in order to improve the quality of reporting between management and 
shareholders. Pincus et al (1989) said that the audit committee is one of monitoring 
mechanisms of corporate management. The existence of an audit committee is expected 
to reduce the possibility of fraud presentation of accounting information, so that 
hypothesis 2 is: 
H2  : Board of directors of the company who did the accounting fraud less likely to 
have an audit committee than companies that do not commit fraud accounting 
information. 
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3. RESEARCH METHOD 
 
3.1. Measurement of Variables  
 
Criteria for accounting fraud (FRAUD) in this research is that if the company re-issued 
disclosure (restatement announcements) in the financial statements. This proxy is used by 
Palmrose (2004) to identify the market's reaction to the stock price if the company did 
restatement. Measurement of this variable is if the company re-issued disclosure 
(restatement announcements) will be given dummy 1, and the other (if not) 0.  
Board of directors from outside the company (outside director /% OUTSIDE) is the 
directors who are not affiliated with the company. Board of Directors from non-
professional management more generally in business operations, can prevent the misuse 
of company resources, so it will be able to improve the performance of the firm 
(Yermack, 1996). Measurement of these variables with the% amount of non-management 
Directors. 
The company's growth (GROWTH) is a development company that shows how the 
company managed to use his resources. This variable is measured by the growth of the 
company's assets during the 2 years prior to restatement. 
Older companies listing on the stock exchange (AGEPUB) is long the company has been 
listed on the stock exchange. The new company listing in the stock market will have a 
high level of risk in doing restatement because the public will push managers to meet the 
expectations (Beasley, 1996). Measurement of this variable is the length of a corporation 
has been listed on the stock exchange. 
Stock ownership by management (MGTOWNBD) is the number of shares held by the 
manager who sits on the board of directors. Lack of ownership by the management is 
expected to increase the company's investor confidence and increase motivation to 
improve the company's stock value (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This variable is measured 
by how much (%) shares owned by management.  
The period of time the board of directors took office (CEOTENURE) is believed to be 
influence the restatement (fraud) in the company, the longer the CEO took office more 
"robust" to influence management (Beasley, 1996). This variable will be measured by the 
length of time a person served as CEO and a control variable. 
Other control variables, the possibility of CEO maintained for the next period (BOSS) is 
whether the CEO and will be maintained for the next period. Measurement of these 
variables with the dummy.  
The existence of the Audit Committee (KAUDIT) is believed to reduce the restatement 
by the company, because the process has gained operational oversight of the audit 
committee. Measurement of these variables with the dummy. 
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3.2. Data Collection 
 
Research data is a restatement events that occurred during the period 2005-2009 on 
public companies in Indonesia Stock Exchange. Data obtained from Reference Center 
Indonesian Capital Market and Capital Market Directory (ICMD). All data is secondary 
data from financial statements (audited). This research will separate the companies that 
have accounting information to commit fraud and similar companies that did not commit 
fraud. Observation period is 1999-2010. Criteria for companies that do not commit fraud 
are:  
a. Have the same size of the company by the company to commit fraud. Measurements 
for the size of the company is the market value of the firm's equity. Comparison if the 
company has the same size is if the market value + 30% of the market value of equity 
companies who commit fraud. 
b. In the same industry category. 
c. The same disclosure period between the company and not cheating. 
Analytical methods will be used in this study is logistic regression (logit). Selection of 
analytical methods adapted to the purpose of the study is to test the possibility of the 
occurrence of an event, in this case the possibility of fraudulent accounting information 
for a company that has a board of directors from within and outside management. 
Research suggested by the model to analyze dichotomous variables with logit (Stone and 
Rasp, 1991) 
 
3.3. Research Model  
 
Logistic regression model as in this research study Beasley (1996) and adapted to the 
conditions in Indonesia are: 
Hyphotesis 1 : 
FRAUDi = α + β1%OUTSIDEi + β2GROWTHi + β3AGEPUBi + β4MGTOWNBDi + 
β5CEOTENUREi + β6BOSSi + ε 
 
 
 
Hyphotesis 2 : 
FRAUDi = α + β1%OUTSIDEi + β2GROWTHi + β3AGEPUBi + β4MGTOWNBDi + 
β5CEOTENUREi + β6BOSSi + β7 KAUDIT+ ε 
 
where: 
FRAUD   = dummy variable, 1 if the company is committing fraud and other 0  
% OUTSIDE  = % board of directors from outside the company.  
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GROWTH  = % of the average total assets for the 2 years before the company 
commit fraud 
AGEPUB  = old company listing on the stock exchange 
MGTOWNBD  = % cumulative shareholding of directors at the company's internal 
CEOTENURE  = long year served as the board of directors 
BOSS   = dummy variable, 1 if the board of directors is still maintained and the 
other 0 
KAUDIT   = dummy variable, 1 if the firm has an audit committee and 0 
otherwise. 
ε    = the residual error 
 
 
4. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS  
The following table is a comparison between the companies that do the restatement and 
non-restatement. Division 2 this group is to show that the sample is similar. Loebbecke et 
al (1989) in Beasley (1996) said that the possibility of fraud is if the management 
company has the same characteristics. The results in Table 1 indicate that the total assets 
and total sales between the two types of samples is not much different. 
 
Table 1 
Comparison between the Performing and Non Performing restatement company 
 Performing 
Restatement Co. 
(Mean) 
[Std. Dev] 
n 
Non Performing 
Restatement Co.  
(Mean) 
[Std. Dev] 
n 
Total Assets* 2.470.843 3.067.987 
 [3.643.678] [5.037.321] 
 27 27 
Total Sales* 522.658 987.095 
 [765.256] [1.558.027] 
 27 27 
  *Million Rupiah 
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The results of logistic regression models for both Model I and Model II can be seen in the 
following table: 
Table 2 
Logit Model Results for Outside Director 
 
    
Coefficient Variable Est. Coefficient T-Stat 
Α INTERCEPT 9,463 0,003 
Board Composition  :     
 %OUTSIDE -1,107 0,166 
Control Variabel :    
 GROWTH 2,147 0,842 
 AGEPUB -0,002 0,587 
 MGTOWNBD 0,045 0,512 
 CEOTENURE 0,078 0,322 
 BOSS 0,014 0,437 
    
R2 
 
 9,1%  
 
Table 2 shows that, overall, the variables showed significant results, although 
%OUTSIDE showed negative results. These results indicate that the company is not 
doing restatement was the composition of the board of directors who come from non-
management greater than the composition of a company that does restatement. These 
results are consistent with Beasley (1996), Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) who 
argued that the directors who come from non-management was effective in monitoring 
the operation of the company. These results support H1, that the company which has the 
composition of non-management directors who did restatement is lower than companies 
that do not do the restatement. Beasley test results (1996) is negative and significant. 
Results are not significant at this research possible because some of the samples did 
restatement does not have a director ouside composition. 
Testing model 2 (Table 3) include the existence of an audit committee as one of the 
factors that are believed to reduce the restatement by company. KAUDIT test results that 
were negative and not significant. Hypothesis 3 was not supported by these results, so 
that the existence of an audit committee does not reduce the likelihood of restatement 
firms. Not significant possibility that the presence of an audit committee is not 
appropriate measurement. The existence of audit committees in corporate personnel 
usually only for a short period (high turnover) so that the measurement would be better if 
you use the activities of the committee itself. Activities committee consists of how many 
times they held a meeting to discuss the company's operational problems. The optimal 
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frequency of meetings 4 times a year (Beasley, 1996). Indonesian capital market 
regulator has required all public companies to establish an audit committee to ensure 
effective performance. 
 
 
Table 3 
Logit Model Results for Outside Director and Audit Committee 
    
Coefficient Variabel Est. Coefficient T-stat 
Α INTERCEPT 12,73 0,564 
Board Composition  :   
 %OUTSIDE -0,976 0,076 
The existence of the impact of the Audit Committee:  
 KAUDIT -0,035 0,674 
Control Variable :  
 GROWTH 1,561 0,872 
 AGEPUB -0,002 0,089 
 MGTOWNBD 0,007 0,965 
 CEOTENURE -0,006 0,644 
 BOSS 2,169 0,423 
    
R2  7,3%  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
This research aims to see whether the company has a corporate governance mechanism 
will reduce the likelihood of restatement. Any restatement would be considered a material 
misstatement to investors. Corporate governance mechanism should be able to reduce the 
likelihood of restatement, which include : the presence of the board of directors who 
come from non- management ( outside director ) and the existence of an audit committee. 
The results support H1 and H2 that the company has a composition of non- management 
directors who did restatement is lower than companies that do not do the restatement. 
Nevertheless , the results do not support H3 that the existence of audit committee will 
reduce the occurrence of restatements. This research has the limitation that the study 
sample is only for the period 2005-2009, the number of firms sampled only 27 
restatement firms and 27 non restatetment company. Further measurements of the audit 
committee that would look better if the number of audit committee meetings conducted 
itself. 
Future studies may add a proxy to measure corporate governance mechanisms, for 
example by an independent commissioner and incentives. The number of companies can 
 11 
 
be reproduced by adding a period of time, in accordance with applying the rules and 
regulations regarding good corporate governance . 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: SAMPLE COMPANY PERIOD 2005-2009 
 
No 
Company  
(Restatement) 
No 
Company 
(Non-Restatement) 
1 Astra Agro Lestari 28 Trimegah Securities 
2 Davomas Abadi 29 Prasidha Aneka Niaga 
3 Excelcomindo Pratama 30 Global Land Development 
4 Lippo E-Net 31 Danayasa Artathama 
5 
Bentoel Internasional 
Investama 32 PP 
6 Zebra Nusantara 33 Agung Podomoro Land 
7 Asia Kapitalindo Securities 34 Indosat 
8 Bekasi Asri Pemula 35 PP London Sumatra Indonesia 
9 Bank Nusantara Parahyangan 36 HM Sampoerna 
10 Bakrie & Brothers 37 Indonesia Air Transport 
11 Bank Victoria Internasional 38 Lamicitra Nusantara 
12 Ciputra Development 39 Bank ICBC NISP 
13 Duta Kirana Finance 40 Bank Bumi Artha 
14 Grahamas Citrawisata 41 Buana Finance 
15 Jaya Real Property 42 Jakarta Setiabudi Internasional 
16 Sinar Mas Multiartha 43 Pudjiadi & Sons estate 
17 Surya Semesta Internusa  44 Summarecon Agung 
18 Bank Internasional Indonesia 45 Capital Inc Investment 
19 Bakrieland Development 46 Bank Mayapada 
20 Indonesian Paradise Property 47 Gowa Makasar Tourism Dev. 
21 Lippo Cikarang 48 Wintermar Offshore Marine 
22 Nusantara Infrastructure 49 Garda Tujuh Buana 
23 Mitra Investindo 50 SUGI Samapersada 
24 Pelita Sejahtera Abadi 51 Gema Grahasarana 
25 Hotel Sahid Internasional 52 Bakrie Telecom 
26 Wijaya Karya 53 Mitra Adiperkasa 
27 Akbar Indo Makmur 54 Multipolar 
 
 
